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Social Welfare and Coercion in Public Finance 
1. Introduction 
In their introductory essay, the editors of this volume analyze a stylized social choice 
situation to illustrate how coercion inevitably arises in any democratic state. It is useful to 
begin by recalling that example here: There is a group of people who have come together in a 
room for a common purpose and who must collectively set the temperature on a thermostat 
and then pay for the resulting use of energy. Inevitably, some end up too hot or too cold, and 
even those for whom the temperature is just right are generally unhappy with the balance 
between what they pay and what they get.
1
 Individuals were able to escape the situation only 
if they moved out of the building. However, if they stayed, they had to put up with the 
coercion implied by their assent to the collective decision. 
 The example embodies several essential aspects of coercion in the public economy. 
Although we shall only deal with one of these in this essay, it is useful to review all of them 
briefly to provide a broader context for our discussion. Individuals will voluntarily participate 
in a collectivity despite its coercive nature if joining makes them better off. This suggests a 
first focus, namely the analysis of why communities form, under what circumstances people 
will join or leave them, and the nature and determinants of coercion that may persist in the 
equilibria of different types of societies. A separate body of work has developed on this topic, 
including the essays in the first part of this volume.
2
 A second focus deals with the choice of 
decision rules once a community has been formed. Here the classic work in a public finance 
context is by Wicksell (1896) and Lindahl (1919). As pointed out in the editors’ introductory 
essay, Wicksell’s proposal for approximate unanimity stems from his desire to minimize 
coercion exercised via the public finances for members of a community while providing for 
their welfare. The mechanism design literature discussed in the previous essay by John 
Ledyard extensively studied the question of the existence under various conditions of the 
Wicksell-Lindahl solution, in which marginal tax prices are equal to individual marginal 
evaluations of the public good that is provided at its Pareto efficient level. 
 Buchanan and Tullock (1962) made a further contribution to this line of work by 
adding efficiency as a criterion in the choice of the decision rule and by considering the trade-
off between decision costs and coercion associated with alternative rules, while Breton 
(1996) examined the relationship between coercion and budgetary institutions. One should 
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note, however, that these authors did not provide a definition of coercion that could serve as a 
basis for welfare comparisons among different fiscal systems or institutional forms of 
government. 
 After collective decision rules have been put in place, participants in any community 
are inevitably faced with coercion arising from policies chosen in an externally fixed decision 
framework. This third aspect of coercion, which has received the least attention in the public 
finance literature so far, is the major focus of this essay. One should note that in contrast to 
the previous essay, we assume that exit from the community is not a viable option. 
 The usual approach in such a context has been to assume the existence of a planner 
who chooses public outputs and imposes taxes so as to maximize a social welfare function. In 
the preceding example, he or she would set the temperature in the room and fix tax rates for 
all the participants under the assumptions that there is agreement on the nature of the welfare 
function to be optimized and that there is sufficient information to do so. Although the 
analysis of specific policies, such as taxation, in the social welfare tradition has been 
extensive and highly successful, the existing literature has not so far dealt with the 
measurement and evaluation of coercion implicit in the possible actions of a planner. 
 In this essay, we examine the nature and measurement of coercion in a planning 
context by focusing on the extent to which individuals are unhappy with the balance between 
what they pay in taxes and what they get from the public sector. In Section 2 we ask whether 
and how such coercion can be formally defined, why it is different from redistribution, and 
how it can be explicitly taken into account in the design of social plans by incorporating 
specially designed constraints into the planner’s problem. We then proceed in Section 3 to 
reexamine the well-known problem of linear income taxation with a public good if coercion 
constraints are imposed. 
 A special concern of fiscal analysis is the trade-off between social objectives. 
Introduction of coercion constraints allows us to formally explore the implications for social 
welfare of varying the degree of coercion in policy design. We pursue this topic in Section 4 
by considering the trade-off between social welfare and coercion, both in a general 
framework and in a more restricted model in which a trade-off curve is explicitly constructed. 
Here the degree of coercion implied by traditional social planning is calculated. 
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 Although the essay emphasizes policy analysis in a planning framework, it is 
important to realize that the use of coercion constraints also has applications in alternative 
institutional settings. Accordingly, in Section 4 we also compare a social plan with the 
outcome of a competitive electoral system by locating both on the same welfare-coercion 
trade-off curve. The analysis provides conditions under which electoral competition may lead 
society to a position on the downward sloping part of the trade-off, where social welfare is 
lower and the degree of coercion is higher than in the corresponding (coercion-unconstrained) 
social plan. 
1.1 Intellectual Antecedents 
Because the combination of social planning and a concern with coercion is unusual, it 
will be useful to consider the underlying ideas and literature somewhat further before 
beginning the formal analysis. In this regard, it should be noted that the design and 
implementation of constraints on the state has a long and distinguished history (see, for 
example, Gordon 1999 and Riker 1982). A concern with coercion has often arisen in the 
analysis of collective choice because individuals do not usually agree on the nature of the 
social objectives to be sought.  For this reason at least, participation in communal 
affairs is often predicated on the preservation of rights that limit the scope of collective 
action. Concern with coercion also arises because of the desire to cope with the agency of 
politicians, bureaucrats, or the military and because of the possibility that some groups of 
citizens may coerce (or take advantage of) others using the collective choice process even in 
the absence of agency control problems. In this essay, we accept the premise that constraints 
on the ability of a collectivity to coerce individual citizens are desirable and explore how 
such constraints ought to influence the structure of the public finances. 
 A precursor to such an inquiry in public finance can be found in the work of Simons 
(1938), who was concerned with establishing tax rules that limit interference in the lives of 
citizens and the private economy while also serving distributional ends. Buchanan and 
Congleton (1998, ch. 8) have more recently developed this approach further, calling for 
imposition of a very simple proportional tax system without a demogrant as a way to limit 
possible coercion. However, these authors do not provide a measure of the coercion implied 
by their proposals. 
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 One should note that coercion can also be imposed in ways other than through the 
balance between what citizens get and what they pay in taxes, including, for example, 
through public administration (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1992), conscription (Levy, 
1997), regulation of access to and limitation of the scope of private markets (Wiseman 1989), 
as well as through the legal system (Anderson 2006, Leiser 2008). In this essay, we set 
administration and other non-fiscal dimensions of public policy aside and confine the analysis 
to coercion arising from the balance between collectively provided goods, services or 
transfers received, and taxes paid. 
 We realize that imposing constraints on a planner derived from a concern with 
coercion extends the analysis beyond criteria generally accepted in the planning literature. It 
also takes us outside of traditional public choice analysis. There have been other attempts to 
explicitly link collective choice concerns with the planning approach to policy analysis by 
imposing appropriate constraints. Acemoglu et. Al (2008) have explored the nature of 
optimal fiscal policy rules when one acknowledges the existence of incentive compatibility 
constraints of politicians.
3
 Here we deal with a different aspect of normative political 
economy: coercion of some citizens by others exercised through collective choice and public 
policy – a problem that would arise even if somehow agency problems were absent. 
 The approach we take to acknowledging the importance of coercion in public finance 
differs from that of mechanism design in an interesting and important manner. A mechanism 
design approach, such as that employed by John Ledyard in the previous essay, starts with 
imposition of voluntary participation constraints for individuals, thus, requiring that people 
voluntarily assent to the fiscal conditions they are faced with, because they always have the 
option of leaving the community. However, many people do not want to leave, often because 
it is costly to do so, and may still object to coercive arrangements. What is at stake in this 
essay, then, is the nature of the community when citizens are committed for whatever reason 
to staying at “home.” 
 In an earlier contribution that implicitly acknowledges the coercive aspects of 
collective fiscal choices, Boadway (2002) proposes to break the formulation of optimal 
policy into four stages: constitutional, legislative, implementation, and market response. At 
each step the analyst takes the results of previous stages, which will include aspects of 
collective choice, as given in the design of a social plan. The approach in this essay is 
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consistent with such a framework, but it goes further by explicitly incorporating coercion 
constraints into an analysis that could be used at any relevant stage. 
2. A Formal Definition of Coercion in Public Finance 
We shall define coercion for an individual as the difference between this person’s 
utility under what he or she regards as appropriate treatment by the public sector and the 
utility that he or she actually enjoys as a result of its operation. To make this definition 
concrete, it is necessary to explain what appropriate treatment means. In the public finance 
setting, there are two polar approaches to this issue, each corresponding to a particular view 
of the relationship between the individual and the state.
4
 The one we shall emphasize is what 
we shall call the individual-in-society definition in which, in terms of our original example, 
the individual citizen remains in the room submitting to, but critically judging, the outcome 
of the collective choice process.
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 Formally, let the individual’s actual tax share be    
  
  
, where jT  is his or her total 
tax payment, with    =     where    is the income tax rate and jY  is income, and P is the 
(assumed) constant supply price of the public good G, and assume, as in Buchanan (1968) 
and Breton (1974, 1996), that the individual believes he would pay this tax share if quantity 
adjustment were possible. Let    be the actual indirect utility of individual j, and   
  his 
maximum utility when he is free to choose the level of the public good     at the individual 
tax price      . Then in the individual-in-society approach, an individual’s coercion is defined 
as 
    * * *
{ }
[ ( , , ) ], ( , , )j j j j j j j j j
G
V G W P V where G argmaxV G W P                            (1)   
where   is the person’s wage or ability. This definition is implicit in the work of Buchanan 
(1968) and Breton (1974, 1996).
6
 In a private competitive market, an individual takes price as 
given, and quantity adjusts so that he or she is always satisfied with what he or she pays for. 
The definition in (1) is motivated by this private market analogue. Here, the individual 
accepts that the tax price is determined by collective choice and would like to, but cannot, 
quantity adjust.It should be noted that the definition in (1) implies that, in general, the amount 
of coercion is simultaneously determined along with the parameters of the fiscal system. This 
holds whenever the extent of coercion is taken into account in deciding on the fiscal system 
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and its implied tax prices, unless the counterfactual is specified independently of 
contemporaneous policy choices. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the individual-in-society definition. Here indifference curves in the 
(t, G) space are constructed from the individual utility function          where X is the 
sole private good, and G is the actual level of public good, and the individual budget 
constraint is          with t the actual proportional tax rate levied on this citizen.7 Then, 
the slope of the indifference curves in (t, G) space is          
  
  
 
  
  
    =            . 
Given his tax share    the price of the public good P and income   , the individual would like 
  
  rather than G at an implied tax rate of   
    
           Coercion (1) is shown as the 
resulting difference in utility between the counterfactual and actual situations,    
      . 
There is an alternative definition of coercion based on a counterfactual that is a polar 
opposite to the individual-in-society approach illustrated in the figure. One could think of 
individuals as judging social outcomes from a perspective in which they alone decide what is 
best for them and for others. In this individual-as-dictator approach (not shown in Figure 1), 
the counterfactual utility would be determined by maximizing the person’s indirect utility 
subject to the government budget restraint that shows all feasible combinations of tax rates 
and actual public good levels. Because the counterfactual then involves a choice directly from 
the government budget constraint, there is never any simultaneity between the counterfactual 
and the actual operation of the public sector. In effect, then, as can be seen by looking at the 
optimization problems introduced later, the problem simplifies to optimizing social welfare 
with different weights on certain individuals. 
  
8 
 
 
                slope = jP/Yj 
      Tax 
      rate 
         Vj                     V*j 
 
           t*j 
 
       t 
 
 
 
       
                         G   G*j                  Public good  
 
Figure 1: Coercion Using the Individual-in-Society Counterfactual 
Legend:  
t : actual tax rate paid 
  
    
            : the implied income tax rate tax at which the individual-in-society is assumed 
to be able to quantity adjust the level of the public good, given his tax share ,j  the price of 
the public good P and income jY  
G : actual level of the public good 
  
 : level of the public good that the individual would like the community to provide at his given 
tax price 
  
 : maximum desired utility at the individual’s given tax price if that person could quantity adjust 
the level of the public good 
  
     : coercion when the individual-in-society counterfactual is adopted 
 
 The individual-as-dictator approach is more appropriate in studying situations in 
which individuals consider whether to join a group rather than for the third aspect of the 
coercion problem in which a community is already assumed to have formed. Moreover, it is 
interesting to confront the role of the counterfactual level of welfare in the definition of 
coercion throughout the analysis. For these reasons, we comment only briefly on the 
implications of adopting the individual-as-dictator approach in what follows. 
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2.1 Coercion Versus Redistribution by a Social Planner 
To understand the definition of coercion in (1), it is helpful to ask at this point why 
standard social planning does not take it into account, even though the difference between 
benefits and costs of public provision for each individual is reflected in individual indirect 
utilities and, therefore, in the social objective. The reason lies in the fact that the social 
planning approach posits no limits on the loss or gain in utility for particular individuals or 
groups occurring as part of a social plan. Any amount of redistribution required in the course 
of maximizing social welfare is implicitly regarded as acceptable – that is, as a matter of 
social solidarity with the planner’s objective, regardless of the degree of coercion implied. 
(We shall return to the difference between coercion-constrained and socially optimal 
redistribution in Section 4, where a coercion-constrained social planner’s optimization 
problem is formally compared to a traditional plan.) 
 It might be argued that application of the Pareto criterion – that only reallocations 
leaving every one better off are permissible – can attenuate concern with coercion. Strict 
application of the Pareto criterion limits the degree of individual coercion for moves from the 
status quo. It does not, however, alleviate any mismatch between benefits received and taxes 
paid that is embedded in the status quo itself. Moreover, much applied work using social 
welfare analysis goes beyond the strict Pareto criterion, which is too weak to allow for most 
social action, using the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky potential compensation criterion instead. In 
that case, reallocations are considered desirable even if some people become worse off, as 
long as gainers could in principle more than compensate losers. For this reason, an explicit 
concern with coercion is justified and needed in most practical instances. 
 To see in general terms that coercion in public life is widely viewed as distinct from 
income redistribution, it is also instructive to consider the Bill of Rights in the United States 
and similar documents or unwritten constitutional rules in other countries. The rights afforded 
by these documents are intended to apply equally to the poor and rich; they were not created 
with reference to income levels but rather with reference to individual lives. There may, of 
course, be an interaction of redistribution as traditionally defined and coercion, but this only 
reinforces the insight that redistribution is not the sole origin of coercion.
8
 A similar point is 
emphasized by Wicksell(1896), who reminds us that an imperfect correspondence between 
what people pay in taxes and what they receive in a democratic society providing public 
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services and collecting taxes differs from voluntary redistribution and should be a cause for 
concern.
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2.2 Using Constraints to Model the Role of Coercion 
To develop a normative approach that allows us to compare and evaluate specific 
fiscal policies and electoral mechanisms in terms of the coercion and welfare they imply, we 
shall proceed by imposing coercion constraints on maximization of social welfare as usually 
defined. The use of constraints in this way may be defended on both conceptual and practical 
grounds. 
 We have already noted the long history of attempts to limit the power of politicians 
and coercion of some citizens by others through the fiscal system. The most important way in 
which limits on such activities have been introduced into political arrangements is by written 
or unwritten constitutional provisions restricting the power of government to abridge 
individual rights. Such provisions do not in principle allow for a trade-off between the rights 
that are given and other policy objectives. They may, of course, be subject to interpretation 
by the courts but always with the understanding that the rights take precedence over other 
public aims. The setting of boundaries or constraints on public action thus represents a well-
known and tested approach to dealing with coercion in public life. 
 A strict welfarist might argue that if it matters to an individual that he is being 
coerced, then this should be reflected in his or her utility function. And if it is, then social 
welfare maximization will take this concern into account. However, introducing coercion into 
a utility function is obviously a shorthand for a complicated social situation.
10
 It is hardly 
clear that this is the best way to proceed, even if using constraints appears to involve the 
introduction of a non-welfarist criterion. 
 Consider an analogy to modeling the social role of money. Macroeconomists have 
tried to come to grips with the role of money in society either by putting money into the 
utility function following Patinkin (1965) – an obvious approximation to the complex social 
role of money – or by adding constraints to the specification of the economy while continuing 
to model individual economic agents in a more or less traditional fashion (e.g., the cash-in-
advance constraints of Clower 1967). Our approach is analogous to the second method. We 
add coercion constraints to a planning problem to incorporate an important aspect of 
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collective choice in a simple and (we think) revealing manner. Although justification on the 
basis of the way in which boundaries on collective action are actually set seems to us sound, 
to an extent the approach we develop also reflects our judgment that it is a useful way to 
proceed in an important area of research in which little progress has so far been made. Our 
investigation remains essentially welfarist in intention, although in a broader context where a 
concern with limits on the degree of coercion is regarded as important for the social welfare 
of the community.
11
 
 Before we can specify the coercion constraints that are to be imposed on the planner, 
there are two additional matters to consider. First, there is the issue of whether we apply 
coercion constraints at the level of each individual, as implied by the use of the subscripts in 
definition (1), or at a group level. Although applying constraints to each individual is 
consistent with the tradition initiated by Wicksell, we also want to explore an approach that 
allows for stronger policy judgments and a greater degree of coercion. Although there is not a 
complete parallel, defining coercion over a group of individuals is similar to the use of the 
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky (KHS) potential compensation criterion. In what follows, we mainly 
employ a constraint on aggregate coercion (its sum across individuals), which is analogous to 
the application of the KHS criterion. The corresponding analysis with individual constraints 
is provided in an Appendix. 
 Second, because the simultaneity of coercion and the actual (or planned) operation of 
the public sector can lead to considerable mathematical complexity, it proves useful for 
working out examples to approximate coercion by using levels of the public good – a method 
that follows Buchanan and Breton. The argument is illustrated in Figure 2. Because the 
marginal evaluation of the public good declines with the size of the public sector, the 
difference in utility in (1) is monotonically related to the difference between the level of the 
public good in the counterfactual and that provided by the operation of the public sector, 
      . To allow for cases in which the difference between G and G* is sometimes 
negative and sometimes positive, we may use the square of the difference in public good 
levels as an index of coercion.
12
 Thus, people who want less of the public good in the 
counterfactual (illustrated in Figure 2) are treated symmetrically with those who would like 
more. This is so because in either case, the actual utility at given tax prices must be less than 
what it would be in the individual’s preferred counterfactual. 
 
12 
 
Figure 2: Coercion Measured by the Level of the Public Good  
The different ways of specifying coercion constraints that have been pointed to are 
conveniently summarized in Table 1, in which we use Kj to denote the “degree” of coercion 
applied to individual j (and, later, κ for the associated shadow price) because the Greek word 
for coercion is katanagasmos. The constraints are specified in the table as inequalities, 
although in the following analysis we assume for mathematical convenience that coercion is 
applied up to the maximum allowed, so that in practice we deal only with equalities. 
Table 1: Alternative Coercion Constraints Based on the Individual-in-society Definition of Coercion 
                                          Type of coercion constraint 
Counterfactual or its Proxy Used 
in the Definition 
Individual ( j = 1...N) Aggregate 
Utility if the individual could adjust 
the level of the public good at the 
prevailing tax-price 
Case 1: 
 
( V*j  – Vj )  
 
 Kj 
Case 2: 
 
j (V*j  – Vj ) 
 
 K 
Desired level of the public good 
given the prevailing tax-price.  
Case 3: 
 
 (G*j – G
.
)
2
   Kj 
Case 4: 
 
j ( G*j –  G )
2
    K 
Legend: 
  
 : level of the public good that the individual would like the community to provide at his given 
tax price 
G: actual level of the public good provided 
K j : the degree of coercion for citizen j. We note that the Greek word for coercion is 
katanagasmos. 
K: (unsubscripted) an aggregate level of coercion 
  
 
 : maximum desired utility at the individual’s given tax price if that person could adjust the 
level of the public good 
Vj : actual level of utility 
  
G 
G 
VjG /j  = the MRS of G for private consumption x, px = 1 
     j P 
G*j 
Coercion = j  (G - G*j ) -  VjG /j dG. 
 
Index of coercion = (G* - G)2 
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 In specifying how coercion will enter the analysis, in addition to coercion constraints 
one may want to acknowledge that coercion may serve as a method of reducing the costs of 
policy actions, such as that associated with the excess burden of taxation, thus having a 
productive as well as a harmful social role. We do not incorporate this possibility into the 
analysis. Excess burdens are defined in the usual manner, independently of the degree of 
coercion.
13
 The emphasis here is on defining coercion arising from the collective provision 
and financing of public goods and services, on investigating how limits to such coercion 
ought to alter the structure of optimal policy, and on comparing the degree of coercion 
implied by optimal policy with coercion that results from a collective choice process. 
3. Coercion-Constrained Optimal Linear Income Taxation with a Public Good 
Having offered a formal definition of coercion, we can now show how the 
introduction of coercion constraints alters the welfare analysis of a fiscal system in which a 
pure public good is financed with a linear income tax of the form         .
14
 We choose 
this application because it permits easy comparison with accepted results in the literature. 
 This investigation differs from that of earlier pioneers Simons (1938) and Buchanan 
and Congleton (1998). In one sense it is less general: they derive the nature of a fiscal system 
they regard as most efficient given the satisfaction of their concern to limit coercion. This is 
the genesis of Simons’s advocacy of the broad base income tax, which by its breadth prevents 
governments from “dipping into great incomes with a sieve.” By starting with a fiscal system 
of a particular type, we cannot replicate this sort of investigation. On the other hand, we shall 
be able to proceed with greater analytical depth with regard to the definition of coercion and 
its role in determining parameters of the fiscal system, allowing careful comparison of the 
coercion-constrained system with the traditional social plan as well as an investigation of the 
trade-off between coercion and social welfare. 
 Assume then that there are N individuals indexed by j, each maximizing utility 
defined over a private good Xj, leisure Lj, and a public good G and receiving a fixed wage Wj. 
The individual’s optimization problem is 
                                                                            (2) 
where, in addition to previous definitions, Hj is the supply of labor, with         .
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 To establish the counterfactual, we consider the individual when he is free to choose 
the level of the public good Gj, given his (average) tax share   , which is assumed by the 
individual to be constant with respect to the level of the public good. This tax share is given 
by the ratio of the tax paid by j to total tax revenue:            . We note for later use that 
with the linear tax system this tax share is 
            
Σ
j
j
j j
tY a
t Y Na




  .                                                               (3)  
Because the marginal cost of the public good P is constant, the actual tax price per unit of  
      is also the one that applies to marginal changes in public services when viewed from 
the perspective of each individual. The individual’s optimization problem we can use to 
define his or her counterfactual then can be stated as 
                          subject to                         (4) 
Solving the first order conditions,        
          
    and        
    , yields the 
counterfactual indirect utility   
 
 in (1), where the (*) reflects the fact that the individual is 
considered to be choosing his most preferred level of G at the given tax price. 
3.1 Social Welfare Maximization under an Aggregate Coercion Constraint 
In choosing fiscal policy instruments, the coercion-constrained planner chooses G, t, 
and a to solve the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to a budget restraint: 
                                   subject to                               (5) 
In addition, the planner faces one or more coercion constraints. In this respect, for simplicity 
we consider case 2 in Table 1, in which coercion is defined using utility levels and 
aggregated across individuals. As we have already pointed out, this case is analogous to the 
use of the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion in cost-benefit analysis. The corresponding 
Lagrangean for the constrained social planning problem is 
                                       
        .    (6) 
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 In solving this problem,     and the shadow price of coercion κ are determined 
simultaneously along with policy instruments, so the coercion constraint cannot be simply 
collapsed into a part (Vj) that can be added to the social welfare function and a remainder that 
is constant and so can be ignored. In other words, as we pointed out earlier, acknowledging 
coercion does not amount to simply placing added weight on the utility of some individuals 
in a social plan. The reason is that a concern with coercion requires that weight be given to 
the counterfactual level of utility for each individual   
 
.
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 By the envelope theorem, the shadow price of coercion κ is equal to       , where 
the star denotes an optimal value. Social welfare will reach its maximum when this derivative 
is zero, at a corresponding and generally non-zero level of aggregate coercion K (to be 
derived in the next section for a particular case). Welfare will then be equal to what it would 
be in the unconstrained or traditional social plan. Accordingly, we may say that when the 
shadow price is high, there will be a large payoff (in terms of social welfare) from solidarity 
with the aims of the unconstrained social planner. We shall consider the shadow price of 
coercion further in what follows, noting at this point only that the formulation of the coercion 
constraint in (6) does not ensure that it will always be positive, because K may exceed the 
level of coercion that is consistent with the traditional social welfare optimum. 
 Using the definition of   
 , we have the first order conditions for the coercion – 
constrained planner’s problem: 
                              
   
  
        
    
  
   
  
         (1) 
                     
   
  
        
    
  
   
  
      (2) 
                       
   
  
                  (3) 
where m
 
j is the marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods for person j, 
and    is his or her marginal utility of money. These equations feature two important new 
elements that are absent from traditional optimal taxation but that are always present in the 
analysis of coercion: 
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1. the translation of tax structure into the tax price – appearing earlier as  
   
  
  and  
   
  
 ; 
and 
2. the translation of the tax price into welfare via the demand for G – shown as   
    
  
 To explore the implications of these equations for fiscal structure, we first use them to 
characterize optimal coercion-constrained policy in a general manner. We begin with (3), 
which characterizes the coercion-constrained size of government. Define the covariance 
between the    and mj by    
                                 . Also define the 
means           and          , and the normalized covariance between j  and mj, 
     
     . The latter reflects the distributional characteristics of the public good. 
 Then substituting these definitions into (3) and manipulating yields a characterization 
of the optimal coercion-constrained level of the public good: 
                     
 
 
        
   
  
 .                            (8) 
Equation (8) is a generalization of the Samuelson condition as amended by Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1974) to acknowledge a concern with coercion of some citizens by others through 
the fiscal system. The right-hand side is the familiar (coercion-unadjusted) social marginal 
cost of the public good net of the induced revenue effects of public provision on labor 
supply.
17
 The left-hand side represents the social marginal benefit from public provision in 
the presence of the coercion constraint. The first two terms here are also familiar: the sum of 
the marginal rates of substitution between private and public goods     , and the term     
, which adjusts the marginal rates of substitution for the distributional characteristics of 
public good. The new term (   ) reflects the effect of the coercion constraint and combines 
with     ) to represent the average effect of coercion. 
 The traditional planning solution in the absence of a coercion constraint is derived by 
setting   =0 in (8). Comparison of the implications for fiscal structure of (8) with those of the 
traditional formula is not straightforward however, as the solution depends on the level of 
coercion as well as on the relationship between K and its shadow price, which is endogenous. 
We discuss the      relationship, the size of government, and the welfare-coercion trade-
off in the next section, where an extended example is explored. 
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 Condition (8) also shows that the coercion-adjusted marginal cost of funds (MCF) 
appropriate for policy analysis is            . This coercion-adjusted MCF will tend to be 
low when κ is high – that is, when increasing K to relax the coercion constraint has a large 
payoff in terms of social welfare. Again, the traditional formula is derived simply by setting 
the shadow price to zero. And although comparison with the two formulas is complicated by 
the endogeneity of κ, it should be noted that the MCF remains relevant in the present context 
as an analytical concept. 
3.2 The Optimal Coercion-Constrained Tax Rate 
To derive the optimal income tax rate in the presence of coercion, we proceed as 
follows. Multiplying (1) by (1/N) and (2) by  2j j jW H / N , subtracting the latter from the 
former, and using the Slutsky decomposition,  / / ,j j j j jH t s W H H a       yields 
         
     
 
 
          
    
 
 
    
    
  
   
  
 
   
  
                (9) 
where j j jY H W  and the negative covariance 
2
Y  shows the relationship between the 
marginal utility of income and income from work and reflect the distributional effects of 
income taxation. Covariance    
   is negative because the higher the level of income, the 
lower the marginal utility. The term /j j jWS W s N   is the mean substitution effect of 
taxation on labor supply, which is also negative. The covariance term in (9),
2
Σ1
 Σ Σ
j j j j j
Ya j j j j j j
H H W H
W W H W
N t a N

    
    
    
 shows the relationship between income 
and the income effect of taxation; it is non-negative when the effect of income on labor 
supply is small for those with high incomes. 
 The quantity qj  / ( / )j jt a Y       in (9) is the change in the tax share of j when the 
tax rate and the lump-sum transfer both change, where a bar above Y denotes its mean. If we 
let       
  =    
    
 , we can write     
    
  
   
  
 
   
  
    =       . Using the covariance 
formula, the right side of this last expression is        =     
 +     , where  and q  
denote the mean values of j  and jq , respectively.  Here    
  captures the relationship 
between the marginal utility of the tax share and the marginal tax share and is an important 
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determinant of how coercion is spread across the community. The value of 2 q  depends on 
the size of the parameters of the utility function and is therefore an empirical matter. If 
taxpayers who experience a large increase in their tax shares will also experience a significant 
fall in utility,    
  will be negative. In addition, by differentiating the tax share we obtain 
/ 0/
j j j j
t a Y          and thus    = 0.18 
 This last result and the definition of 2 q  in (9) leads to the coercion-constrained 
optimal income tax rate:               
                  
        
      
 
             
   
                                    (10) 
When the shadow price is positive and the    
  covariance is negative, the optimal rate t rises 
with κ because the    
  covariance is negative and so is the denominator. That is, the higher is 
the payoff to solidarity with the aims of the unconstrained social planner, the higher the 
optimal coercion-constrained income tax rate. However, note that the size of government and 
of tax rates may still be lower in the constrained situation than in the traditional social plan.
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 By comparing equation (10) with its traditional counterpart, obtained by setting κ = 0 
(which need not be stated explicitly here), one can see that the more general formulation of 
the optimal tax rate features four new terms in comparison to the standard formula: the 
shadow price of coercion κ; the covariance    
  between the marginal utility of the tax share 
and the marginal tax share; and via    
 , the translation of the tax system into tax shares 
/j a   and the translation of the tax price into welfare via the demand for G,   
    
 .
 
 The analogue to conditions (8) and (10) when individual coercion constraints are 
imposed on the planner is worked out in the Appendix. The solutions are much more 
complicated, involving also the distributional pattern of coercion as one should expect. It 
turns out to be the case that in comparison to the Kaldor-Hicks-like situation, government 
size and tax rates may be larger or smaller when coercion is specified at the individual level. 
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4. The Trade-off between Social Welfare and Coercion 
The existence of the trade-off in the present framework allows us to explore some of 
the implications for public finance of the clash of social objectives with individual rights 
embedded in the coercion constraints. We begin by considering the relationship of the 
shadow price of coercion and the degree of coercion in the case of the linear income tax and 
the welfare-coercion trade-off implied by this relationship. In the linear income tax case, 
maximization of social welfare subject to the government budget and an aggregate coercion 
constraint involves solving a system of five equations: first order conditions (1) – (3), the 
government budget constraint j jt WjH = Na+PG , and the coercion constraint      
      
= K. The five unknowns are the three fiscal parameters, t, a, and G, and the two Lagrange 
multipliers,   and  . This means that the solution for the shadow price of coercion (along 
with the rest of the endogenous variables) is a function of the distribution of individual tastes 
for work, leisure, and consumption, captured by the parameters of the utility function and 
denoted by Γ ; the characteristics of the distribution of earning abilities captured by the wage 
rates and denoted by W ; the marginal cost of the public good P; and the level of coercion K. 
 We may write the implied solution for the shadow price of coercion (as well as that 
for all other endogenous variables) as = ( P,K),  Γ,W,  and the general solution for 
coercion-constrained social welfare as S* = F( ,P,K).Γ,W  As noted earlier, these are linked 
by the envelope theorem */ ( / ) .j jdS dK dV dK     If κ is positive (negative), coercion-
constrained social welfare is rising (falling) with the level of coercion K, and when   is zero, 
social welfare is at its maximum and policy instruments will conform to their traditional 
optimal tax values. ( , , ) 0k P K Γ,W  thus defines implicitly the value of ( OTk K )  that is 
implied by traditional social planning. 
Figure 3 illustrates one possible relationship between the shadow price and the 
aggregate degree of coercion. The part of the K   curve labeled the “consensual society” is 
where welfare and coercion are positively correlated. This part is where any society that 
positively values both social welfare and the absence of coercion would like to be. Such a 
society would not want to be at the point associated with a traditional social plan, where 
OTK K . 
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Figure 3: A Possible Relationship Between the Shadow Price of Coercion   
and the Aggregate Degree of Coercion K 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
K
OT 
  =  the degree of aggregate coercion corresponding to the traditional (coercion –unconstrained) social plan  
 
The part of the K   curve to the right of KOT corresponds to the downward sloping 
part of the welfare-coercion trade-off, where welfare increases as coercion declines. This part 
is to be avoided without compensating virtues. 
 In the example illustrated, the implied trade-off between social welfare and coercion 
would be concave with its peak at K
OT
. However, this is a hypothetical relationship. What 
does the welfare-coercion trade-off look like for the linear income tax case we have 
explored? This turns out to be a difficult question to answer. As shown in the Appendix, in 
the linear income tax model with an aggregate coercion constraint, we cannot even sign the 
slope of the shadow price – coercion relationship, the derivative /d dK , without further 
assumptions. 
 In the next section, we provide an explicit derivation of the trade-off between social 
welfare and the degree of coercion in a more simplified setting. Here we shall also compare 
the point on the trade-off chosen by a traditional social planner with the outcomes that result 
from the operation of exogenously determined collective choice processes. 
5. The Welfare-Coercion Trade-off in a Simplified Setting 
To proceed further, we assume that taxation is strictly proportional to income, utility 
is Cobb-Douglas, and aggregate coercion is measured using levels of the public good as in 
case 4 of Table 1. The utility function of voter j is defined over private consumption jX  and a 
public good G;   ,  1j j j j j jU lnX lnG       .  Income jY  is assumed to be 
K
OT 
K 
 
0 
A consensual society: coercion and social 
welfare are positively correlated 
The backward bending region: coercion 
may be reduced and welfare increased 
 κ 
        
κ 
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exogenous, and there are N individuals in the society. Because the tax system is proportional 
at rate t, for each citizen, j jX =(1- t)Y . Normalizing the unit price of the public good to 
unity, the budget constraint of the government is j jt Y G  . Aggregate coercion will be 
defined by the level of the public good, so that the coercion constraint is 
           
  
 
               .      (11) 
 Because there are only two policy instruments linked by the government 
budget restraint in the simplified setting, the coercion constraint is sufficient to determine the 
level of the public good in the coercion-constrained planning problem once the 
counterfactual,   
 , is specified. The latter is determined by maximizing jU  subject to the 
budget constraint j j j jY = X + τ G ,  where j  is the ratio of the tax paid by j to the total tax 
revenue, j j j jτ =T / T . With a proportional income tax system, the latter is simply 
j j j jτ =Y / Y . Indirect utility of j can then be written as 
                
  
    
           ,  and maximization of this with respect to jG  
yields 
    *
jj j
j
G = Y   .                             (12) 
Thus in the simplified model, the counterfactual demand for the public good depends 
only on the individual taste for the good and total income and is independent of what the 
planner does.
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 It will be helpful at this point to outline the outcome of coercion-unconstrained or 
traditional social planning, as a benchmark for what is to follow. This planner chooses G and 
t to maximize the weighted sum of individual utilities,                      subject to 
the government budget restraint. (The introduction of the weights jz  will facilitate later 
comparison of social planning with collective choice processes.) Using the covariance 
formula          
        , where a bar denotes the mean value of a variable, and 
exploiting the equality 1N z  , maximization of welfare S subject (only) to the government 
budget constraint yields the optimal policy: 
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       and                
  .    (13) 
The aggregate degree of coercion associated with this standard fiscal system is not 
zero. Using G
OT
 in (11) shows that the degree of coercion in traditional social planning is 
positive and equal to 
                
       
    .                    (14) 
Intuitively, coercion in a social plan rises with the magnitude of demands for the 
public good, because the welfare losses from departures from preferred counterfactuals are 
larger then, with heterogeneity of tastes for the public good, because it is harder to satisfy a 
more heterogeneous community with the same restricted set of policy instruments, and with 
the covariance between the intensity of preferences for the public good and the weights of 
individuals in the social welfare function, because the social planner attaches a higher priority 
to the satisfaction of those with high preference for the public good. (When individuals with 
intense preference for the public good, high value of γ, enter the social welfare function with 
a large weight, high value of z, the covariance    
  is positive, and so K
OT
 is rising with the 
latter.) 
5.1 The Trade-off 
Observing the coercion constraint generally requires that a nonlinear relationship be 
maintained between aggregate coercion and public sector size. Substituting from (12) into the 
coercion constraint (11) and using formulas for mean and variance indicates that 
K = N [G2 – 2   (Y)G + (   +   ) (Y)2]     (15) 
where implicitly, / 1/ 2 ( ).dG dK N G Y   Therefore, G increases with K as long as its 
initial size is greater than Y , the standard optimal tax value when    
  = 0, and it decreases 
with K when G is less than this value. This is a complicated pattern, showing the difficulty of 
making comparisons of the fiscal system in a coercion-constrained fiscal system and in a 
traditional social plan using general formulas like (8) and (10). 
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 To derive coercion-constrained social welfare, S, we substitute G implicitly defined by 
(15) into the indirect utility functions in S and aggregate across citizens. The result yields the 
welfare-coercion trade-off.  Differentiating S so derived with respect to K, we see that 
   
2 ( )( )
OT
dS G G
dK N G Y Y G G


   
    and                                                                   
 
       
   
2
2 32
2 2
1 2
4
OT OTG G G Y G Y G G Y Gd S
dK N G Y G G Y
 

       
 
  
 
.         (16) 
Then, using (13) and the definition of aggregate private consumption, 
j j j jX = Y -G  , shows that
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
      
We can conclude that when the standard social plan is employed, welfare reaches its 
unconstrained maximum and that the trade-off between social welfare and the degree of 
coercion is globally concave. This concave trade-off is illustrated in Figure 4. The upward 
sloping part of the trade-off corresponds to what we referred to as the “consensual society” in 
Figure 3.  
 In Figure 4, K
OT
 is again the degree of coercion corresponding to social planning. K
MR
 is 
the degree of coercion corresponding to majority rule in a competitive political system, which 
we shall analyze shortly. The origin (K = 0) is blanked out because the Lindahl solution may 
not be feasible, and if so, the planner’s coercion-constrained social welfare planning problem is 
then not defined.  
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Figure 4: The Welfare - Coercion Trade-off 
 
Social Welfare                        S
OT
      
 S j z j U j (K )    
                             S
MR
 
   
 
 
            
                       
    
     A  Consensual  
    Society 
 
                                                                             
                    
             
      K
OT
     K
MR
            Degree of Coercion 
 
6. Collective choice Versus Social Planning 
The use of coercion constraints represents a general approach of analysis that is also 
applicable in other settings of fiscal decision making, thus allowing for a new type of 
comparison among systems for reaching collective choices. To explore this important 
extension of the approach, we now inquire as to how democracy compares to the traditional 
social plan in terms of their implied trade-off between welfare and coercion. We shall 
consider a competitive electoral system in which policy outcomes represent a balancing of 
the heterogeneous economic interests of citizens, as in a probabilistic spatial voting model. 
This model is well described in the literature (see, for example, Hettich and Winer 1999, 
Persson and Tabellini 2000, Tridimas and Winer 2005, Adams, Merrill and grofman 2005, 
and Schofield and Sened 2006) and will be outlined quickly here. Variants of this model can 
be used to describe equilibria in proportional or majoritarian electoral systems, but we shall 
retain a more general viewpoint. 
 There are two expected vote-share-maximizing parties, A and B, whose policy 
platforms converge in the competitive political equilibrium. Voting behavior of individual 
citizens differs according to their economic interests including tastes for the public good, as 
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well as according to individual political sensitivities, or propensities to switch support 
between parties if one of them offers the voter a more preferred fiscal system. Parties are 
assumed to have the same knowledge of the stochastic distribution of the characteristics of 
voters. 
 Whether a voter votes for party A depends on two components: a policy component 
and a non-policy component. The policy component depends on the indirect utility of the 
voter (specified earlier) when party A rather than B implements its proposed policy. The non-
policy component, or valence, depends on how the voter evaluates the ideology or other 
personal characteristics of the competing politicians.
22
 Formally, voter j supports party A if 
          >                , where V is again indirect utility. The valence term ( + sj)  
has two components:  common to all voters and uniformly distributed on  1/ 2 ,1/ 2  , 
and a term sj, which is an idiosyncratic preference uniformly distributed on     
 
 
    
    
 
 
       . 
 The expected vote share that party A maximizes by choice of a fiscal system is 
      1, – ,  
2
A j j j A A j B B
j j j
P V G t V G t
 

 
     
                           (17)  
Here, j  represents the voter’s political sensitivity – that is, the effect on the 
probability that he will support party A of a change in his well-being (that results from a 
proposed change in A’s platform.) Analogously, B maximizes B AP = 1- P . 
 Because the parties converge in the Nash electoral equilibrium, to characterize the 
equilibrium without loss of generality we maximize PA with respect to GA and tA subject to 
the budget constraint facing any successful party, with GB and tB constant, which requires   
 
    0.
jA
j
j
dVdP
dG dG
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Since utility is Cobb-Douglas, this implies that the political equilibrium values of G and t are 
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Denoting the relative political sensitivity of voters j by j j j j jθ ζ / ζ , θ =1    and using the 
covariance formula, equilibrium fiscal structure can then be written in a convenient form 
easily compared to the policy (13) chosen by the unconstrained planner: 
                          
       and                  
 .                         (18) 
The corresponding degree of coercion is 
    
22 2 2 ΣΥMRK N N  
  
  
                                              (19) 
That is, similarly to (14), the degree of coercion will be higher with the size of 
demands for the public good (captured by the level of income), the heterogeneity of tastes for 
the public good (captured by   
 ), and the covariance between the intensity of preferences for 
the public good and the political sensitivity of voters (   
 ), because voters with high intensity 
of preference for the public good are politically more influential. 
 A comparison of planning and democratic political competition shows that 
                                      
2 2 23 2 2  ΣΥMR OT zK K N   
   
  
.         (20) 
If the planner weighs all citizens equally (   
   ), coercion in the competitive 
political system will always exceed that imposed by the social planner. The essential reason 
for this is that majority rule introduces fiscal discrimination according to political influence, 
in addition to that according to narrowly defined individual economic preferences. And, 
because K
OT
 corresponds to the point of maximum welfare, social welfare in the democracy 
will be lower, at some point on the backward bending part of the trade-off. 
 One possibility that this conclusion opens up is that of reducing coercion while 
raising social welfare, either by imposing additional constraints on the nature of fiscal 
instruments (as Simons (1938) and Buchanan and Congleton (1998) suggest) or by changing 
the nature of the collective choice mechanism (as suggested by Wicksell (1896) and many 
others since).
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 Another possibility is that the constraints on state action imposed by 
globalization may serve as effective constraints on coercion. However, exactly what each 
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proposed or actual institutional change implies in terms of a well-defined welfare-coercion 
trade-off remains to be formally investigated in future research. 
7. Conclusion 
Although coercion is a central fact in the design and operation of the public sector, 
normative public economics based on the planning model has not made it an explicit element 
of the analysis. In this essay, we formally introduce coercion into normative analysis by 
adding constraints that limit allowable coercion caused by tax and expenditure programs. We 
focus on situations that arise when citizens experience a mismatch between what they receive 
in public goods and services and what they pay in taxes. The essay demonstrates that it is 
possible to conduct formal analysis of the structure of public policy taking coercion into 
account even without knowing the optimal degree of coercion. In particular, one can 
delineate the welfare-coercion trade-off and ask what policies are consistent with attainment 
of the frontier and where particular institutions lead in relation to coercion-unconstrained 
social planning. 
 To make the concept of coercion operational, a counterfactual specifying what 
individuals regard as appropriate treatment by the public sector is required. We have 
employed a counterfactual that assumes that the individual accepts some coercion by society, 
along with a socially determined tax price. One may then specify coercion constraints either 
in terms of individual or aggregate utility or by using a convenient approximation that relies 
on a reference level of government expenditure. The aggregate definitions are analogous to 
the use of the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion and impose a less severe constraint on 
decision making than those having an individual basis. 
 Coercion constraints have important and complex effects on a social plan. Using both  
aggregate (KHS-like) and individual coercion constraints, we work out these effects for a 
fiscal system that uses an optimal linear income tax to provide a public good. These cases 
were chosen because they permit straightforward comparisons with standard optimal tax 
results, including the size of government, the pattern of average rate progressivity, and the 
marginal cost of funds. A novel aspect of the analysis relates to the trade-off between social 
welfare as traditionally defined and coercion. Using a Cobb-Douglas formulation, we derive a 
trade-off function, as well as the degree of coercion implied by unconstrained social 
planning. The analysis allows us to examine how to achieve the highest level of traditionally 
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defined welfare for a given degree of coercion or, in other words, how to be coercion 
efficient. The trade-off between narrowly defined welfare and aggregate coercion raises the 
possibility that collective choice in a democracy will tend to lead us to a point on the 
downward sloping part of the trade-off, opening up the possibility that coercion may be 
reduced and social welfare increased by appropriate institutional reform. 
 Extensions of the analysis are possible in several directions. One could, for example, 
explicitly account for the interaction of incentive compatibility and coercion constraints. Such 
interaction would occur in situations in which the coercion of individuals in different income 
groups is relevant to decision making by those who may find it advantageous to mimic the 
behavior of others. In addition, coercion will have relevance for the structure of the fiscal 
system. Although we have considered coercion when only an income tax is employed, the 
analysis could be extended to situations in which a full mix of direct and indirect taxes 
exists.
24
 More generally, the relationship between complexity of tax structures and the 
coercion-welfare trade-off also deserves investigation. One suspects that more complex fiscal 
systems, which are also administratively more costly, may involve less coercion for a given 
level of welfare.
25
 
 The trade-off analysis can also be used to investigate how coercion can be reduced at  
given levels of social welfare through institutional means. Work on the scope of the public 
sector suggests that the boundary between private and public sectors matters in this regard 
and that the welfare-coercion frontier may be shifted favorably by removing certain types of 
economic activity from the public sphere. The trade-off function could be used to formalize 
this argument. 
 Public goods coercion also has relevance for the discussion of federalism. Following 
Tiebout (1956), the literature on optimal assignment in federations has been concerned with 
balancing the welfare gains from decentralization with the loss of efficiency from fiscal 
externalities that arise under decentralized decision making. One may expect decentralization 
to reduce coercion, but this connection has not yet been formally acknowledged or analyzed 
in the optimal assignment literature.
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 Finally, the welfare-coercion frontier also allows us to extend the analysis of 
collective choice in an important way. The concept provides a new basis for comparing 
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political equilibria under alternative institutional arrangements or voting rules and for the 
ranking of such equilibria with respect to the implied trade-off between welfare and coercion. 
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Appendix 
1. Linear Income Taxation with Individual Coercion Constraints 
When the planner is constrained by how much he or she can coerce each individual 
taxpayer separately (as in case 1 of Table 1), the Lagrangean for the planning problem 
becomes 
                                      
       (A1) 
Although the situation is considerably more complex than before, the corresponding 
first order conditions are generalizations of equations (7) and are not stated here. Working as 
before, the condition for the optimal coercion-constrained size of government (analogous to 
condition (8)) becomes
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jmj) [(1+) (1+) +  ] = 
 
 
        
   
  
     (A2) 
where in addition to previous definitions,  s = σ
2
λ/λκ  is the covariance between coercion 
and the marginal utility of income; sκm =    
     is the covariance between coercion and the 
marginal rate of substitution; sκλm =     
       is the covariance between coercion, the 
marginal utility of income, and the marginal rate of substitution; and finally, where   s+ 
sm + sm 
The right-hand side of equation (A2) is already familiar. It is the product of the 
marginal valuation of government revenue times the net marginal rate of transformation of 
the public good. The left-hand side of (A2) again shows the marginal benefit from the public 
good. However, now it is the product of the sum of marginal rates of substitution multiplied 
by the adjustment for the combined effect of the distributional characteristics of the public 
good and the effects of coercion. In the present case of individual coercion constraints, the 
adjustment for coercion contains two new elements relative to standard social planning, (a) 
the average effect of coercion (1+δ)(1+κ), a term that also appears in the previous case of 
aggregate coercion, and (b) the term κ, which corrects the aggregate term for the 
“distributional characteristics of coercion.” 
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 We use the term “the distributional characteristics of coercion” advisedly here, for 
want of a better one. Because concern with coercion arises out of concern with individual 
rights or, alternatively, with the degree of social solidarity individuals have with the 
objectives of the planner, it is not clear that we ought to think about it the same way that we 
do redistribution in the traditional planning model. 
 Now the benefit from public provision increases in the following cases, assuming κ is 
positive: (a) if the rich (low λj) view the payoff from solidarity with the planner less favorably 
(low κ), so that    
  > 0 and sκλ > 0; (b) if those who value public goods less (low mj) “have 
less social solidarity” (low κ), then   
  > 0 and sκm > 0; and (c) if the rich (low λj) also value 
public goods less (low mj), so that     
 > 0 and sκλm> 0, because the previous two effects are 
compounded. 
 If all these conditions apply,   is positive. Then, on comparing (8) and (A2), one can 
also say that the KHS-like solution for a coercion-constrained optimum (8) will involve less 
spending and a lower tax rate than when coercion is defined on an individual basis. However, 
either of these comparisons could in principle go the other way, and it will be interesting to 
determine in practice what situation is likely to apply. 
 To derive the optimal income tax rate under individual coercion constraints, we 
require additional covariances (normalized again by the means of the indicated variables): 
    
 = the covariance of κj, λj and Yj;      
 = the covariance of κj, ψj, and qj;    
 = the 
covariance of κj and Yj;    
 = the covariance of ψj and κj;    
 
 = the covariance of κj; and qj. 
Also, let κ, λ, ψ, and q be the mean values of κj, λj, ψj, and qj, respectively. Then, using these 
definitions and the Slutsky equation, and working as before, we obtain the formula for the 
coercion-constrained optimal income tax rate
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t = 
        
      
      
      
      
      
 
               
   (A3) 
 This optimal income tax rate depends as usual on the income distribution effect of 
taxation, captured by σ2λY, and the efficiency effect of taxation on labor (shown again by the 
denominator). In common with the case of aggregate coercion, it also depends on the 
relationship between the marginal utility of the tax share and the marginal tax share σ2ψq. In 
addition, the optimal tax rate depends on the distributional effects of coercion, as the 
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remaining four covariance terms make clear. It should be noted that little is presently known 
about the sign or size of the covariances involved. 
2. Derivation of dκ /dK in Section 4, Showing that in the Case of Linear Income Taxation 
and an Aggregate Coercion Constraint, the Sign of This Derivative is Ambiguous 
Maximization of the welfare function subject to the government budget and the 
coercion constraint generate a system of five equations with five unknowns: the three first 
order conditions (1), (2), and (3), the government budget restraint (5), and the aggregate 
coercion constraint     
       = K. 
 Here there are five unknowns: the three fiscal parameters, t, a, and G, and the two 
Lagrange multipliers, μ (for the budget constraint) and κ (for the coercion constraint). Solving 
the preceding system gives us the formulas for, t, a, and G that we discuss in the text, as well 
as the solutions for μ and κ. 
 As noted in the text, the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are a function 
of the distribution of individual tastes for work, leisure, and consumption, captured by the 
parameters of the utility function and denoted by Γ; the characteristics of the distribution of 
earning abilities captured by the wage rates and denoted by W; the price of the public good P; 
and the degree of (aggregate) coercion K. We may write the system of reduced-form 
equations: 
( ,  ,  ,  );  ( ,  ,  ,  );  ( ,  ,  ,  );  ( ,  ,  ,  );  ( ,  ,  ,  ).t t W P K a a W P K G G W P K W P K W P K                 (A4) 
Using the assumptions of the linear tax model in Section 4, totally differentiating the system 
of equations (A4), using subscripts to denote derivatives and rearranging gives the following: 
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where:   
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Att  (1+)(tY+Yt) – (2Yt+tYtt) – *PG*tt; 
Ata  (1+)(aY+Ya) – (Ya+tYta) – *PG*ta;  
AtG  (1+)(GY+YG) – (YG+tYtG);   t  Y+tYt;   t  Y – *PG*t 
Bat  (1+)t + (Ya+tYat) + *PG*at; 
Baa  (1+)a + tYaa + *PG*aa;  
BaG  (1+)G +YaG;   a  NtYat;   a   + *PG*a 
CGt  (1+)UGt + (YG+tYGt);   CGa  (1+)UGa + tYGa;  
CGG  (1+)UGG +tYGG; G  PtYG;   G UG 
 
 By Cramer’s rule, 
Dd
dK



 where |D| = 
0
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 and || is the 
determinant of the matrix of coefficients in (A5). This derivative cannot be signed 
unambiguously even with the assumptions of the simple linear income tax model, because 
none of the individual terms in the determinants of D and  can be signed without making 
further assumptions. 
                                                          
Footnotes 
1
 If Lindahl pricing was feasible and implemented, at given tax prices everyone would vote for the 
same setting on the thermostat (or level of the public good). Disagreement over the setting of tax 
prices may remain however. 
2
 See also Hirschman (1970), Skaperdas (1992), Usher (1993) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003). 
3
 They argue that optimal policy then requires the distortionary taxation of both capital and labor to 
reduce the amount of rents that need to be paid to the politician. One may note here that incentive 
compatibility constraints are themselves dependent on the nature of threats and force that is 
permitted in society, an issue taken up by the editors in their introductory essay. They are not given 
entirely by the state of nature. What is known about individual politicians or taxpayers depends on 
the range of actions that may be legitimately applied in uncovering individual characteristics and in 
preventing socially undesirable behavior. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) who argue for 
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generally taking conflicts between economic and political forces into account in the design of 
public policy. 
4
 Buchanan (1968, 145–146) stresses the importance of the nature of the social situation in doing 
public finance. 
5
 Hart (1961) argues, as we see it, that to accept coercion as a result of a collective choice process, the 
individual must be assured that law-abiding citizens in society will not be taken advantage of. Or, 
in other words, that the situation must involve the threat of legal sanction backed by force to deal 
with possible tax evasion. The individual-in-society definition of coercion we shall use and that in 
the legal tradition may thus be seen as having a common basis. On coercion in the legal tradition, 
see also Anderson (2006).. 
6
 Breton (1974) defines coercion as depending on the deviation of marginal evaluations of public 
services from tax prices. Although the total amount of coercion defined in (1) varies with this 
difference, it is not coercion itself. 
7
 With a proportional tax (a linear income tax with no lump sum component), the point (t,G) must lie 
on the dotted tax-share line. With a demogrant, the relationship between the tax rate and the 
individual tax share is more complicated. 
8
 In an interesting paper complementary to the current one – the perspective is that of the first issue 
identified earlier – Perroni and Scharf (2003) develop a positive theory of the self-enforcing fiscal 
system. The problem they begin with is that there is no external power to enforce the power to tax 
so that ultimately, in their view, all fiscal systems must be self-enforcing equilibria in which the 
continual consent of the public is sought. They search for efficient, self-enforcing equilibria that are 
robust to renegotiation among groups of citizens. As a consequence, they claim (result 4) that when 
citizens have identical preferences, efficiency and renegotiation proofness requires horizontal 
equity in taxation. However, as they explicitly state, this is “fully unrelated to any distributional 
goal” (p. 9). Rather, in their approach, it is a matter of ensuring the stability and viability of society 
as a whole. 
9
 “From the point of view of general solidarity … parties and social classes should … share an 
expense from which they receive no great or direct benefit. Give and take is a firm foundation of 
lasting friendship. … It is quite a different matter, however, to be forced so to contribute” Wicksell 
(1896/1958, 90). 
10
 The same is true if coercion is put into the welfare function but outside of individual utilities. 
11
 See Kaplow (2008) for an extensive comparison of the Pareto principle and criteria that formally 
depart from standard social welfare maximization, but which may nonetheless serve welfarist ends. 
12
 It should be noted that it may be the case that only one of these two types of individuals will arise in 
a fiscal system. The reason is that coercion depends on what individuals think is appropriate 
treatment for themselves, not what is actually feasible for society as a whole. 
13
 For example, we do not explicitly allow the planner to force independent evaluations of ability on 
taxpayers, or to coercively uncover economic activity, thereby relaxing incentive compatibility 
constraints. 
14
 Here neither the tax rate t nor the lump sum component a varies across individuals, thus providing a 
simple way of introducing the excess burden of taxation while also ruling out a Lindahl voluntary 
exchange equilibrium in which taxes are raised without any welfare loss. With a = 0 the tax is 
proportional to income, with a > 0 it is progressive, and with a < 0 regressive. For comparability with 
the literature, we follow Sandmo’s (1968) notation. 
15
 To help the reader follow later derivations, we note here that solving this problem yields the usual 
condition UjL/UjX = (1–t)Wj, the final demand for the private good Xj = Xj[(1–t)Wj, a, G], the labor 
supply Hj= Hj [(1–t)Wj, a, G], and the indirect utility function Vj =Vj[(1–t)Wj, a, G]. Denoting the 
marginal utility of income by j, the partial derivatives of utility with respect to the fiscal variables for 
person j are Vjt = – jYj, with Yj=Wj(1-Lj); Vja =  j and
 
VjG = UjG., and the marginal willingness to pay 
for the public good is mj = UjG / UjX = VjG /j. 
16
 One may also note that if there is only one person, or if everyone is identical, there will be no 
difference between V* and V at an optimum, and any coercion constraint will be irrelevant. 
Coercion as defined here has no meaning in a single agent planning model. 
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17
 It is equal to the product of the marginal valuation of government revenue, /   and the net (of 
induced revenue) rate of transformation of the public good, P– tj Wj (
 
Hj/G). 
18
 To derive this expression, we differentiate τj in (3) with respect to t and a and recognize that a change 
in t and a affects the level of income. 
19
 If the individual-as-dictator counterfactual had been used to define coercion, the counterfactual utility 
would no longer depend on the choice of the fiscal system, and the resulting formula for the tax rate 
would be simpler, omitting the second term in the numerator of (10). (The general form of the 
solution for G given by equation (8) is the same with both counterfactuals, although the level of G 
will differ in each case.) 
20
 Thus the assumptions of Cobb-Douglas utility, defined over two goods only (with no labor- leisure 
choice), and exogenous income result in the same counterfactual level of G*j under both the 
individual-in-society and the individual-as-dictator approaches. 
21
 PROOF. Differentiation of S(K) yields  / (1 )[ 1/ ( )] / (1/ ) /dS dK z Y G dG dK z G dG dK         .          
Substituting from (15) we have / ( ) / 2 ( )( )dS dK z Y zG N G Y Y G G         . Recalling that  G
OT 
= 
Σzγ ΣY and using the covariance formula yields the first derivative in (16). Differentiating this with 
respect to K, we obtain the following expression for the numerator of the second derivative in (16):  
 [numerator d
2
S/dK
2
] = 
    3 2 2 2 2( / ) (1 ) ( ) ( / ) 3 2 (1 ) ( )dG dK G Y G Y G dG dK G Y G Y Y z G                      . Substituting for 
dG/dK and rearranging then yields the second derivative, QED. 
22
 Adding the stochastic valence term, which has a continuous probability distribution, introduces 
continuity into the expected vote-share functions of the opposing parties and by so doing eliminates 
the possibility of a vote cycle. Equilibrium also requires concavity of these objective functions, 
which here is assured by the form of the utility function. 
23
 On the other hand, if society is on the upward sloping part of the trade-off, additional constraints on 
public policy of this sort may reduce social welfare along with coercion. 
24
 See, for example, Boadway and Marchand (1995) on incentive compatibility and public expenditure 
and Hettich and Winer (1988, 1999) on the formation of tax structure. Compared to the existing 
literature, a new element in the work on tax structure will be preferences for public goods, because 
coercion depends in part on such preferences. 
25
 Yitzaki (1979) and Hettich and Winer (1999) have dealt with tax complexity, but not in a 
framework that explicitly acknowledges coercion. 
26
 For reviews of the literature, see Wildwasin (2006) and Wilson (1999). Pennock (1959) analyzed 
the relationship between majority rule and federalism, arguing that decentralization increases the 
total number of citizens in a majority coalition. However, although this suggests that 
decentralization reduces coercion, he did not measure coercion formally nor integrate efficiency 
into his argument. 
27
 To derive (A2), note that the analogue to first order condition (3) when coercion constraints apply 
to individuals is j (1+κj)λj m
 
j = μ [P– tj Wj (
 
Hj/ G)]. The left-hand side of this can be written as 
j(1+κj)j m
 
j =j jmj + jκjj m
 
j. Recall that κ, , and m are the means of κj, j, and mj, 
respectively: cov(κjj) = (1/N) j (j–)(m
 
j– m) and cov(κjj m
 
j) = (1/N) j (κj–κ)(j–) (m
 
j– m). 
Manipulating the covariances and using the new first order condition yields intermediate steps:  
jjmj =N   
 + λjmj and jκjjmj =[κλjmj +N(κ   
 +λ   
 + m   
 
 +    
 )]. 
28
 To proceed, one multiplies the analogue to (1) for individual constraints by (1/N) and that for (2) by 
(j Wj Hj / N
2
) and subtracts the latter from the former. The left-hand side of the result involves the 
distributions of three variables: the individual coercion constraint κj, the marginal utility of income 
j, and income Yj. Similarly, the right-hand side features the individual coercion constraint κj, the 
marginal utility of the tax share ψj = *jPG*j, and the marginal tax share, qj=[(j/t)+(j/a)Y], 
as well as the effect of income taxation on labor supply. Applying the definitions of covariances in 
the text then yields (A3). 
